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Abstract
■ Anthropomorphism, the attribution of distinctively human
mental characteristics to nonhuman animals and objects, illus-
trates the human propensity for extending social cognition be-
yond typical social targets. Yet, its processing components
remain challenging to study because they are typically all engaged
simultaneously. Across one pilot study and one focal study, we
tested three rare people with basolateral amygdala lesions to
dissociate two specific processing components: those triggered
by attention to social cues (e.g., seeing a face) and those
triggered by endogenous semantic knowledge (e.g., imbuing a
machine with animacy). A pilot study demonstrated that, like
neurologically intact control group participants, the three
amygdala-damaged participants produced anthropomorphic de-
scriptions for highly socially salient stimuli but not for stimuli
lacking clear social cues. A focal study found that the three
amygdala participants could anthropomorphize animate and living
entities normally, but anthropomorphized inanimate stimuli less
than control participants. Our findings suggest that the amygdala
contributes to how we anthropomorphize stimuli that are not
explicitly social. ■
INTRODUCTION
Humans are undeniably social animals, exhibiting social
behavior not merely toward other humans but also
toward plants, animals, technological devices, and putative
supernatural agents like God. This process of humanizing
nonhumans, anthropomorphism, involves attributing dis-
tinctively human mental states (e.g., intentions, emotions,
thoughts) to these entities (Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo,
2007). Anthropomorphism represents a fundamentally
social process of attributing specifically mental charac-
teristics (e.g., “my laptop is manipulative”) rather than
merely observable characteristics (e.g., “my laptop is
silver”). However, the psychological processes that
underlie anthropomorphism—and whose differential en-
gagement may produce important individual differences—
remain poorly understood. Here, we follow up on a prior
study of the role of the amygdala in anthropomorphism
(Heberlein & Adolphs, 2004) to examine the differential
engagement of bottom–up versus top–down processes
in anthropomorphism.
Given the pervasiveness of anthropomorphism (Gray,
Gray, & Wegner, 2007), many have suggested that
anthropomorphism represents a relatively automatic,
effortless, and intuitive process. Humphrey (1976, p. 312)
suggested that humans’ tendency to reason socially
about nonhuman stimuli represented “a predisposition
among men to try to fit non-social material into a social
mould” (emphasis ours). This view suggests that humans
are naturally inclined to anthropomorphize. Similarly,
Caporael (1986) suggested that anthropomorphism of
machines is a “default schema,” and later Caporael and
Heyes (1997) proposed anthropomorphism as a “cog-
nitive default.” Guthrie (1997) similarly described reli-
gious belief in this way, stating “Our tendency to
overestimate animacy and humanity in the world con-
stitutes a cognitive default.” These views suggest that
we begin reasoning about nonhuman entities by anchor-
ing on humanlike conceptions and adjusting from there
(often insufficiently).
Some empirical evidence supports the view of anthro-
pomorphism as automatic, effortless, and intuitive. Devel-
opmental research suggests children reason inductively
about nonhuman animals through anthropocentrism—
using “human” as the prototypical concept to attribute
properties to nonhumans (Inagaki & Hatano, 1987;
Carey, 1985). Other work shows children as young as
12 months infer the mental states of simple shapes
(Gergely, Nadasdy, Csibra, & Biro, 1995), suggesting that
anthropomorphism emerges early. Studies of adults also
demonstrate people are biased to think of God anthro-
pomorphically (Barrett & Keil, 1996). Finally, a vast pro-
gram of research on anthropomorphism of technology
shows people “mindlessly” apply humanlike rules, norms,
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and stereotypes to interactions with computers (Nass &
Moon, 2000).
An alternate view suggests that anthropomorphism
does not represent a cognitive default (Herrmann,
Waxman, & Medin, 2010) and must be first triggered to
occur (Waytz, Klein, & Epley, 2013). Considerable re-
search has identified predictable stimulus-contingent
triggers, such as the extent to which a particular stimulus
moves or looks like a human. These human-like stimulus
characteristics trigger people to access the concept of
“human” to make inferences about a nonhuman stim-
ulus. Research has also shown that different people
anthropomorphize to varying degrees, with differing
thresholds for doing so (Waytz, Cacioppo, & Epley,
2010). For example, people are particularly prone to
anthropomorphize when they desire social connection,
seek to understand their environment, or encounter a stim-
ulus that morphologically resembles a human (Epley,
Waytz, Akalis, & Cacioppo, 2008; Morewedge, Preston, &
Wegner, 2007; DiSalvo, Gemperle, Forlizzi, & Kiesler,
2002; Eddy, Gallup, & Povinelli, 1993). These findings
suggest that anthropomorphism may be triggered by at-
tention to stimulus-contingent social cues. However, the
threshold for this trigger may also be influenced by the
goals of the perceiver, thereby moderating the impor-
tance of stimulus-contingent features.
Research with clinical populations has also shown that
psychiatric conditions or brain damage may influence the
threshold at which anthropomorphism is triggered. For
example, individuals with autism anthropomorphize
shapes and computer-animated agents less than non-
autistic individuals (Chaminade, Rosset, Da Fonseca,
Hodgins, & Deruelle, 2015; Castelli, Frith, Happé, &
Frith, 2002; Abell, Happe, & Frith, 2000), whereas people
with schizophrenia may overperceive human agency in
the world around them (Gray, Jenkins, Heberlein, &
Wegner, 2011). Other research has shown that brain
damage can reduce anthropomorphism, including dam-
age to the right hemisphere (Weed, McGregor, Feldbaek
Nielsen, Roepstorff, & Frith, 2010) and amygdalae
(Heberlein & Adolphs, 2004).
The present research compares participants with spe-
cific amygdala lesions to neurologically healthy par-
ticipants to partly dissociate the multiple psychological
processes that guide anthropomorphism. Given the
amygdala’s role in attention and social cognition (see
Adolphs, 2010) we hypothesized that amygdala damage
would reduce anthropomorphism toward objects that
normally engage goal-directed attention or that rely on se-
mantic knowledge (such as a laptop computer, which does
not look human). Such a dissociation revealed in neuro-
logical participants would help provide further insight into
the architecture of anthropomorphizing and could even
suggest biological markers associated with individual dif-
ferences (such as amygdala size in healthy individuals).
A prior case study examining amygdala damage and an-
thropomorphism (Heberlein & Adolphs, 2004) involved
participants viewing and describing animated shapes de-
signed to elicit anthropomorphic descriptions (Heider &
Simmel, 1944). In contrast to comparison participants
(neurologically healthy individuals and individuals with
damage to the OFC) who described the shapes anthropo-
morphically with mental states, the amygdala-damaged
participant described the shapes in almost entirely in-
animate terms (i.e., merely describing their motion). These
findings suggested that amygdala damage could impair
spontaneous anthropomorphism, supporting the amyg-
dala’s key role in social cognition. Importantly, however,
when prompted with explicit questions that described
the shapes as people with personalities, the amygdala-
damaged participant provided anthropomorphic descrip-
tions, showing that the ability, knowledge, and vocabulary
to make social attributions were entirely intact. On a sep-
arate task, this participant was also able to describe a dog,
an “overtly animate creature” (Heberlein & Adolphs, 2004,
p. 7489), in anthropomorphic terms.
These prior findings already demonstrated a striking
dissociation between “spontaneous anthropomorphizing
despite apparently intact social knowledge” (the title of
the article of Heberlein & Adolphs, 2004). However,
limitations of that study raise important and unanswered
questions that form the basis for the present work. First,
the prior study (Heberlein & Adolphs, 2004) was a single-
case study based on a single individual with amygdala
lesions and based on a limited range of social stimuli.
Perhaps most importantly, it did not systematically con-
trol for stimulus-contingent factors known to influence
anthropomorphism. Consequently, those initial findings,
intriguing as they are, leave open the question of what
the specific factors might be and how they might depend
on the amygdala. We took these prior findings to suggest
a distinction between the capacity for mental state attri-
bution and the perception of socially salient information
triggering this attribution—essentially in a dissociation
between social “performance” and social “competence”
as processes that differentially depend on the amygdala.
Based on these findings, we thus predicted that amygdala-
damaged individuals will attribute mind (i.e., humanness)
to entities that are sufficiently socially salient to trigger
these attributions. We address this issue by examining
whether amygdala lesions would impair anthropomor-
phic attributions made to explicitly social stimuli (i.e.,
stimuli that possess social cues, like facial features or
animate motion) versus stimuli that totally lack visual
social cues but may be associated with social knowledge
through semantic knowledge and reasoning (e.g., a lap-
top computer).1
The present research examines this distinction further
in light of research advances on both amygdala function
and anthropomorphism. The amygdala’s role in process-
ing social and emotional information is well established
(Martin & Weisberg, 2003; Schultz et al., 2003), yet more
recent views suggest the specific role of the amygdala in
processing information relevant to the social and emotional
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“goals” and “motivations” of the perceiver (Cunningham
& Brosch, 2012; Sander, Grafman, & Zalla, 2003). This
motivational salience view suggests that the amygdala re-
sponds to both socially rewarding and socially threatening
information (Van Bavel, Packer, & Cunningham, 2008), as
both are relevant to perceivers’ goals to affiliate with
trustworthy others and to avoid untrustworthy others.
Also consistent with this hypothesis, research has demon-
strated that bilateral amygdala damage is associated with
reduced attention to socially relevant information such as
others’ eye gaze and facial expressions (Kennedy &
Adolphs, 2012), but that explicit instructions about where
to attend can elicit relatively intact social judgments about
such stimuli (even for amygdala-damaged individuals;
Adolphs, Gosselin, et al., 2005). In light of this revised
view of the amygdala’s function, Heberlein and Adolphs’
(2004) findings suggest the alternative explanation: The
amygdala-damaged participant’s reduced spontaneous
anthropomorphism resulted not from an inability to
anthropomorphize or process explicit social cues but
rather from not perceiving these shapes as socially
relevant or salient.
To gain additional neuroanatomical specificity to test
this idea, we also tested neurological participants with
more restricted lesions to the amygdala than the partici-
pant S. M. (original participant of Heberlein & Adolphs,
2004). In particular, our three participants all had
complete damage to the basolateral nucleus of the amyg-
dala, but at most minor damage to the central or medial
nuclei. The basolateral nucleus is the nucleus known to
be bidirectionally connected with neocortex; thus, it
receives visual inputs from visual neocortex and also
sends feedback projections back to those visual cortices
(Amaral, Price, Pitkanen, Carmichael, & Aggleton, 1992).
It is involved in attentional modulation of sensory in-
formation processing in these cortical regions. Indeed,
tracer studies in monkeys show that the basolateral
amygdala projects to all visual cortical regions, even
those from which it does not receive inputs (Frees &
Amaral, 2005). It projects all the way back to primary
visual cortex and is thus in a prime position, given this
anatomical connectivity, to implement the function that
we hypothesize to test here: providing a spontaneous
attentional signal when socially relevant information is
being processed, an attention signal that is normally
automatically engaged and that triggers the retrieval
of social knowledge and inferences used to make
anthropomorphic attributions. The specific role for
the basolateral amygdala in anthropomorphizing that
we advance here is supported by several recent studies
(Mormann et al., 2015; Spunt et al., 2015; Wang,
Tudusciuc, et al., 2014; Wang, Xu, et al., 2014), some
of them in the very same lesion participants we stud-
ied here.
Given the minimally social nature of the animated
shapes in the prior study (Heberlein & Adolphs, 2004),
it is perhaps unsurprising that the amygdala-damaged
participant did not spontaneously respond to them in a
social manner. However, recent research on anthropo-
morphism has used a wider array of methods and a wider
array of stimuli with varying social salience and relevance
that may prompt anthropomorphism even for people
with reduced sensitivity to social cues. For example, peo-
ple attribute mental states to nonhuman stimuli such as
plants that move at a humanlike speed compared with
those that do not (Morewedge et al., 2007). People an-
thropomorphize robots that resemble humans more
than robots that do not (DiSalvo et al., 2002), and people
attribute more mental states to nonhuman animals that
are more morphologically similar to humans (e.g., pri-
mates, dogs) than to those that are dissimilar (e.g., inver-
tebrates, fish; Eddy et al., 1993). It is thus important to
examine anthropomorphism across such a range of stim-
uli with varying degrees of explicitly social cues present.
The present studies use stimuli with varying degrees of
social salience to examine the extent to which basolateral
amygdala damage reduces anthropomorphism of non-
human stimuli in general or whether such reductions
in anthropomorphism are modulated by the presence of
socially salient triggers (e.g., animacy). These stimuli
are presented in both written and video format to dem-
onstrate similar effects across media of varying visual
intensity and to provide further generalizability of our
findings.
Overview of Studies
Two studies examine our hypothesis. A pilot study with a
limited set of healthy comparison participants tested
whether amygdala-damaged participants would exhibit
high versus low anthropomorphism toward stimuli preva-
lidated as displaying or not to displaying social cues
(Abell et al., 2000; Castelli, Happé, Frith, & Frith, 2000).
A focal study with a larger and better matched sample
of healthy comparison participants tested whether
amygdala-damaged participants (vs. healthy comparison
participants) would differentially anthropomorphize
stimuli that exhibit high versus low social salience. It
showed that, whereas the participants with amygdala
lesions could anthropomorphize stimuli with clear
social cues present, they failed to do so when social
cues were absent, revealing a dissociation in the pro-
cesses that trigger anthropomorphizing.
PILOT STUDY
A pilot study tested whether amygdala-damaged partici-
pants are capable of anthropomorphism toward stimuli
that convey clear social cues but not toward stimuli that
lack these cues. Importantly, this study did so using stim-
uli that have already been validated as systematically vary-
ing in social salience (Abell et al., 2000; Castelli et al.,
2000). We asked participants to describe video stimuli
that convey low, moderate, or high degrees of social
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salience, with the hypothesis that they would anthropo-
morphize highly socially salient stimuli but not stimuli
with low social salience.
Methods
Participants
Three women with bilateral lesions to the basolateral
amygdala (Figure 1) caused by Urbach–Wiethe disease
participated. All our amygdala participants had substan-
tially more specific lesions than the original sole partici-
pant studied in Heberlein and Adolphs (2004), S. M.,
whose damage encompassed essentially the entire amyg-
dala. Two of the participants, A. M. and B. G., are identical
twin sisters from rural southern Germany, 36 years of
age, married with children, and in full-time employment
since receiving their 13 years of education in Germany.
The third participant, A. P., is American. She is 27 years of
age and has worked since she obtained her bachelor’s
degree. All threeparticipants have an IQ in the average range,
as measured by the Hamburg-Wechsler-Intelligenztest
für Erwachsene Revision (A. M.: 101; B. G.: 96; Becker
et al., 2012) or the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intel-
ligence (A. P.: 98; Wechsler, 1999), and are comparable
to healthy comparison participants in this regard. Their
lesions are all similarly symmetric and confined to the
amygdala (A. M.: 1120 mm3 bilaterally; B. G.: 1150 mm3;
A. P.: 710 mm3). The damage includes complete calci-
fication of the basolateral amygdala with minor damage
of other amygdaloid regions, including anterior and
ventral cortical regions at the rostral level and lateral
and medial parts of the central nucleus and amygdalo-
hippocampal area at the caudal level.
We sought to maximize the generalizability of our find-
ings by including all participants we could access who
had bilateral amygdala lesions. Notably, we excluded
those who had substantial damage outside the amygdala
or who had cognitive impairments that would have
precluded valid performances on our tasks. The only
etiology known to produce relatively selective bilateral
amygdala lesions is a genetic disease (Urbach–Wiethe
disease, also called lipoid proteinosis), which is exceed-
ingly rare (Hofer, 1973). Although there are a handful
of other such participants in the world (e.g., Thornton
et al., 2008), these other individuals typically have low
IQ and additional cognitive impairments. The original
amygdala participant in Heberlein and Adolphs (2004;
participant S. M.) has also suffered additional medical
problems in later years and has developed possible
extra-amygdalar lesions, making her unsuitable for this
study.
For a healthy group comparison, we utilized in this
pilot study a small unpublished archival comparison
sample (we were unable to obtain data from German
speakers for the pilot study). Because the stimuli for this
study are visual without use of text, primary language
should have a limited impact on scores. The comparison
sample was acquired from 14 individuals (3 women and
11 men) recruited from the community as part of an
earlier, unrelated study. The comparison group and
amygdala participants did not differ on age (M = 35.79,
SD = 15.89), t(15) = 0.294, p = .773, and Full Scale Intel-
ligence Quotient (M = 105.86, SD = 11.01), t(15) =
1.149, p = .268. To maximize our comparison group size,
we included all available comparison data, including data
acquired from men (even though our amygdala partic-
ipants are all women).2
Materials
The animation test The animation test consists of a set
of 12 video clips (length: 34–45 sec) depicting two trian-
gles moving against a framed white background. These
clips have been used in prior research on social attribu-
tions to visual stimuli (Horan et al., 2009; Abell et al.,
2000; Castelli et al., 2000). Half the animations depict also
A B C
Figure 1. T-1 weighted MRI
images from participants with
amygdala lesions. A = A. P.;
B = A. M.; C = B. G.
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a framed enclosure with an opening. Three different
types of interactions are compared, which are designed
to convey differing levels of social cues: “theory of mind”
and two control conditions: “goal-directed” and “ran-
dom.” The theory of mind animations in general fea-
ture one triangle pretending, persuading, seducing, or
surprising another and thus convey a high degree of so-
cial cues (e.g., see https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=qH1O6l6FDq0). The four goal-directed animations
show the two triangles dancing, chasing, fighting,
or following and thus convey a moderate degree of
social cues (e.g., see https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=dx7MZh3E3vE). The four random animations depict
the two triangles bouncing, drifting, spinning, or float-
ing and thus convey a low degree of social cues, exhib-
iting more general properties of motion (e.g., see
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=57a_wbwEi5c).
Across all animations, the shape, speed, and orienta-
tion of the triangles were kept as similar as possible.
Procedure
The animation test was presented to each participant in-
dividually, with stimulus order counterbalanced across
participants. Instructions were presented on the com-
puter screen and read aloud by the examiner. After
viewing each animation, participants responded orally
to the question, “What was happening in the anima-
tion?” All responses were recorded and later transcribed
for scoring. The German-speaking participants with
amygdala lesions responded orally in German, and re-
sponses were translated into English for scoring.
Scoring Deidentified answers were compiled subject-
wise in random order and were evaluated by the test
developer and creator of the scoring system, who was
blind to participant diagnosis. Each item was scored along
two dimensions: Anthropomorphism was measured
through participants’ “intentionality” score (as this score
captures the degree of mental state attribution toward
nonhuman stimuli, 0–5 points) and “appropriateness”
(0–3 points). Scoring was conducted using the methods
described in Horan et al. (2009). Per this scoring system,
high intentionality referred to description of complex,
intentional mental states and purposeful movements
related to the other character (triangle) whereas low
intentionality referred to nondeliberate action such as
“bouncing around,” and high appropriateness referred
to a clear answer identifying “the events depicted in
the animations, as intended by the underlying scripts”
whereas low appropriateness referred to no answer or
stating, “I don’t know” (Horan et al., 2009, p. 638).
Statistical analyses were conducted using mean intention-
ality and appropriateness scores for each participant.
Results and Discussion
For all three levels (random, goal directed, and theory of
mind), the amygdala-damaged participants’ anthropo-
morphism (as measured by their intentionality score)
and appropriateness ratings varied across the mean point
of the comparison group and the confidence intervals
(CIs) overlapped across groups (Figure 2). A 2 Group ×
3 Animation level repeated-measures ANOVA was con-
ducted for each rating (appropriateness and intentional-
ity). Consistent with previous studies (Abell et al., 2000;
Castelli et al., 2000), we found that anthropomorphism
(i.e., intentionality) increased across the progression
from random to goal directed to theory of mind in our
sample, F(1.222, 18.325) = 34.429, p < .001, ηp
2 =
.697. In addressing comparison of amygdala participants
and comparison participants, the groups did not differ on




overlaid. ToM = theory
of mind.
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intentionality ratings overall, nor was there a significant
interaction of group by animation level: Group, F(1, 15) =
2.236, p = .156, ηp
2 = .130; Group × Animation Level,
F(1.222, 18.325) = 0.577, p = .490, ηp
2 = .037. For
appropriateness ratings, the overall pattern across con-
ditions was also consistent with previous findings:
Appropriateness ratings decreased across the progres-
sion from random to goal directed to theory of mind,
F(2, 14) = 9.702, p= .002, ηp
2 = .581. However, although
the groups did not differ on intentionality ratings, the
amygdala-damaged participants’ appropriateness ratings
were generally lower than the comparison group, F(1,
15) = 4.987, p = .041, ηp
2 = .250, without a notable
interaction of Group × Animation Level, F(2, 14) =
0.975, p = .402, ηp
2 = .122. These results suggest the
movement cues in these stimuli can elicit anthropo-
morphic descriptions from amygdala-damaged par-
ticipants, but their descriptions may not accurately
capture the specific social scripts commonly perceived
in these stimuli.
This pilot study demonstrates that amygdala-damaged
participants are capable of anthropomorphism toward
stimuli that exhibit clear social cues. However, amygdala-
damaged participants were less capable than healthy
participants in accurately and appropriately describing
the social interaction, despite accurately inferring specific
mental states of distinct characters (e.g., Zaki, Bolger, &
Ochsner, 2008).
Both amygdala-damaged participants and healthy
comparison participants exhibited similarly low levels of
anthropomorphism toward clearly nonsocial stimuli.
Rather than reflecting something about either group, this
finding may simply reflect that these nonsocial (random)
stimuli were insufficient to trigger anthropomorphic
attributions from any observer, as they more clearly
displayed nonsocial activities. Indeed, 4 of 15 compari-
son participants were at floor for anthropomorphism of
these stimuli. Most critically, amygdala participants were
capable of anthropomorphizing when stimuli clearly
conveyed social salience.
This study differs from the prior work showing that an
amygdala-damaged participant exhibited exceedingly low
anthropomorphism toward animate video stimuli (similar
to the one used in this study) compared with a healthy
comparison group (Heberlein & Adolphs, 2004). The de-
velopment of the theory of mind videos used here in-
deed were inspired in part by Heider and Simmel’s
(1944) animation of shapes exhibiting contingent inter-
action that Heberlein and Adolphs (2004) employed in
their study. Whereas amygdala-damaged participants
here readily anthropomorphized shapes that displayed
social cues, the amygdala-damaged participant in the
2004 study did not. This divergence may result from
any number of methodological differences, including
different location of amygdala damage across participant
samples or differences in stimuli. Participants in this
study viewed multiple videos clearly containing social
cues in concert with other social videos clearly lacking
in social relevance, as opposed to a single video in the
2004 study. It is possible that the present context enabled
amygdala-damaged participants to anthropomorphize
more. Importantly, the amygdala participant in the 2004
study, in a control task, did anthropomorphize a dog that
conveyed clearly social cues, demonstrating that, as seen
in the present research, animacy and social salience can
produce anthropomorphism even for amygdala-damaged
individuals. Most critically, this study demonstrates that
amygdala-damaged individuals are more capable of
anthropomorphism than previously thought and are





As in the pilot study, we sought to maximize the
generalizability of our findings by including all participants
with bilateral amygdala lesions that we could access. Thus,
we tested the same three amygdala participants as in
the pilot study individually at Caltech using Qualtrics
software.
The comparison group consisted of 93 total participants—
73 German-speaking healthy women, with mean age of
31.23 years (SD = 6.20, range = 23–56 years), and 20
healthy American women, with mean age of 36.60 years
(SD= 12.07, range = 22–59 years). The amygdala-damaged
participants and comparison participants were thus group
matched for sex and were also group matched for age,
t(94) = −0.486, p = .628, 95% CI [−11.599, 7.04]. All
comparison participants completed the study online and
completed three measures described below.
We aimed to have 20 comparison participants for
each amygdala-damaged participant (20 American, 40
German). In the end, our German colleague provided
us access to 73 German participants. We used all avail-
able participants (3 amygdala, 20 American healthy
comparisons, 73 German healthy comparisons) in
our analyses and did not add or exclude any par-
ticipants. We limited our sample to women because
the available participants for our lesion group were
all women, and we wanted to match our comparison
group, which was larger than the pilot study, by sex.
All data provided by the participants described here
are analyzed below.
To quantify the difference between lesion participants
and healthy comparison participants, we show effect sizes
and used permutation testing to provide CIs. These
ways of presenting data, in the absence of null hypoth-
esis significance testing (NHST), are recommendations
made broadly in psychology studies (Cumming, 2014).
In select circumstances, we report results from NHST
(specifically ANOVA).
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Materials
Individual di f ferences in anthropomorphism
questionnaire Participants completed the Individual
Differences in Anthropomorphism Questionnaire (IDAQ;
Waytz, Cacioppo, et al., 2010), a 30-item questionnaire
that asks participants to indicate the extent to which
technological entities (e.g., a television), natural entities
(e.g., a mountain), and nonhuman animals (e.g., a cow)
possess mental states (e.g., consciousness, emotions,
intentions, free will, a mind of its own; 0 = not at all,
10 = very much). The 15 items that assess mental state
attribution were summed to comprise the anthropo-
morphism subscale, and three subscale scores were
calculated by summing five questions specific to each
category (α = .82 for technology, α = .80 for animals,
α = .85 for nature). Fifteen additional items asked about
the extent to which each item possesses a nonmental
trait related to appearance or external behavior (e.g.,
active, lethargic, useful, good-looking, durable). These
items were summed to constitute the nonanthropo-
morphism subscale, and three subscale scores were calcu-
lated by summing five questions specific to each category
(α = .26 for technology, α = .37 for animals, α = .50 for
nature). In the initial validation of the IDAQ, Waytz,
Cacioppo, et al. (2010, pp. 221, 228) note that nonanthro-
pomorphic items “are included to dissociate anthropo-
morphism from dispositional attribution more generally
and to ensure that differences in anthropomorphism do
not merely reflect differences in scale use…these items
were developed simply to measure a diffuse set of non-
anthropomorphic attributions rather than a single coher-
ent construct.” This is also why nonanthropomorphism
composites for the IDAQ and for the stimuli described
below have lower reliabilities than the anthropomor-
phism composites, which comprise items meant to
represent a unified construct.
Dogs and robot videos Participants viewed two videos,
one of two dogs and one of a mechanical robot that
contained a computer screen and that moved on two
wheels. In the dogs video, a smaller dog moves more
variably and a larger dog moves more slowly and
predictably—previous research has validated that these
dogs vary on predictability (Epley et al., 2008), and they
are described below as the unpredictable dog and
predictable dog. After viewing each video, participants
rated the extent to which each dog and the robot (de-
scribed in the instructions as a “gadget”) had mental states
indicative of anthropomorphism: “a mind of its own,”
“free will,” “consciousness,” and the extent to which each
stimulus “experienced emotions.” These items were aver-
aged to comprise an anthropomorphism score for each
stimulus (αs = .83 for both dogs, α = .89 for the gadget).
Participants also completed three items unrelated to
anthropomorphism: the extent to which each stimulus
was useful, durable, and good-looking—these items were
averaged to comprise a nonanthropomorphism score
for each stimulus (α = .70 for the unpredictable dog,
α = .71 for the predictable dog, α = .59 for the gadget).
All items were rated on a 7-point (1 = not at all, 7 = very
much) scale.
Predictable and unpredictable gadgets task Participants
read descriptions of four technological gadgets: Clocky
(a wheeled alarm clock that “runs away” so that you must
get up to turn it off ), CleverCharger (a battery charger
designed to prevent overcharging), Pure Air (an air puri-
fier for people with allergies or respiratory problems),
and Pillow Mate (a torso-shaped pillow that can be pro-
grammed to give a “hug”). Participants evaluated each
gadget described in both ways—as operating predict-
ably or as operating unpredictably (previous research
validated these descriptions as evoking predictability
or unpredictability; Waytz, Morewedge, et al., 2010).
After reading each description, participants answered a
question about the extent to which they could control
the gadget (not analyzed here) and completed five an-
thropomorphic mental-state ratings: the extent to which
the gadget had “a mind of its own,” had “intentions,”
had “free will,” had “consciousness,” and “experienced
emotions.” These items were averaged for all gadgets
across each description type (predictable or unpredict-
able) to comprise an anthropomorphism score for each
one (both αs = .95). Participants also completed three
items unrelated to anthropomorphism: the extent to
which each device was attractive, efficient, and strong—
these items were averaged for all gadgets across each
description type (predictable or unpredictable) to com-
prise a nonanthropomorphism score for each one (α =
.88 for unpredictable gadgets, α = .85 for predictable
gadgets). All items were rated on a 7-point (1 = not at
all, 7 = very much) scale. Participants also completed
short personality measures on loneliness, personal con-
trol, and familiarity with various stimuli for which we
did not calculate scores or analyze because they did not
pertain to the research question.
Procedure
Administration order of anthropomorphism measures
was randomized across participants. For the German
participants, all text was translated into German.
To control for differences in comparison group distri-
butions for the two nationalities, we calculated z scores
for each amygdala participant’s ratings relative to the
culture-specific comparison group and for each compar-
ison participant relative to the mean and standard devia-
tion of all other comparison in that group.
We compared the lesion participants and comparison
participants in two ways. First, we estimated how the
three lesion participants would compare with three peo-
ple randomly drawn from the general population. For
each rating, we built a bootstrap population estimate
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from 100,000 randomly selected (with replacement)
groups of three comparison participants. For each
measure of interest, the amygdala-damaged participants’
scores were compared with the bootstrap-sampled
distribution. Second, we compared CIs for each group
(amygdala participants and original/nonbootstrapped
comparison group) and reported the difference between
each amygdala participant’s score and the original com-
parison group mean (as a fraction of comparison group
standard deviation).
Results and Discussion
Because of the small sample size among amygdala-
damaged participants, we first consider variables that
yielded clearly consistent results across all three amygdala-
damaged participants. We will then comment on what
we can learn from their pattern of results within each
measure. We present results for anthropomorphism first
and nonanthropomorphism second.
Anthropomorphism Ratings
Anthropomorphism ratings on all three tasks provided
evidence that in general amygdala-damaged participants
anthropomorphize stimuli with low social salience
(inanimate technology-based stimuli, except the set of
unpredictable gadgets that are known to trigger social
attributions) to a lesser degree than the comparison
group. This is evident when contrasting participants’ rat-
ings with the bootstrapped comparison distribution, as
well as when contrasting with the original comparison
group means. All three amygdala-damaged participants’
anthropomorphism ratings were below the mean of the
bootstrapped comparison distribution for technology
(Figure 3), robots (Figure 4), and predictable gadgets
(Figure 5). Table 1 reports differences between each par-
ticipant’s ratings and comparison group mean, along with
CIs for both groups. To interpret the figures and table
correctly, please note that Table 1 reports CIs from the
actual comparison group whereas Figures 3–5 show dis-
tributions (and 95% CIs) for the bootstrapped compari-
son group.
Compared with the comparison group mean rating for
technology (M= 0.0388, SD= 1.153), A. P.’s ratings were
0.42 SD lower and ratings for both A. M. and B. G. were 0.54
SD lower. The amygdala lesion and comparison group
averages were moderately distinct (d = .50), with nonover-
lapping 95% CIs [−0.153, 0.329] for comparison partici-
pants and [−0.578, −0.442] for amygdala participants.
Figure 3. Distribution of IDAQ
scores from bootstrap samples
(green = anthropomorphism;
blue = nonanthropomorphism),
with scores at the lower and
upper bound of the 95% CI
shown by black dotted lines.
Scores of individual amygdala-
damaged participants are
overlaid on top. *No overlap
of CIs.
Figure 4. Distribution of
dogs and robot scores from
bootstrap samples (green =
anthropomorphism; blue =
nonanthropomorphism), with
scores at the lower and upper
bound of the 95% CI shown by
black dotted lines. Scores of
individual amygdala-damaged
participants are overlaid on top.
Predictable = predictable dog;
Unpredict. = unpredictable
dog. *No overlap of CIs.
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Compared with the bootstrap-sampled distribution, only
17.50% of the bootstrap comparison group had mean
anthropomorphism ratings of technology below the
mean of the amygdala participants.
Compared with the comparison group mean rating for
robots (M = 0.032, SD = 1.114), A. P.’s ratings were 0.55
SD lower and ratings for both A. M. and B. G. were 0.37
SD lower. The amygdala participant and comparison
group averages were moderately distinct (d = .43), with
nonoverlapping 95% CIs [−0.150, 0.316] for comparison
participants and [−0.583, −0.379] for amygdala partici-
pants. Compared with the bootstrap-sampled distribu-
tion, only 17.67% of the bootstrap comparison group
had mean anthropomorphism ratings of robots below
the mean of the amygdala participants.
Compared with the comparison group mean rating
for predictable gadgets (M = 0.030, SD = 1.086), A. P.’s
ratings were 0.56 SD lower and ratings for both A. M. and
B. G. were 0.53 SD lower. The amygdala participant and
comparison group averages were moderately distinct
(d = .54), with nonoverlapping 95% CIs [−0.162, 0.290]
for comparison participants and [−0.584, −0.545] for
amygdala participants. Compared with the bootstrap-
sampled distribution, only 8.2% of the bootstrap com-
parison group had mean anthropomorphism ratings of
predictable gadgets below the mean of the amygdala
participants.
For all other variables (IDAQ ratings of animals and
nature, both dogs, and the unpredictable gadgets), the
amygdala-damaged participants’ anthropomorphism
ratings varied across the mean point of the comparison
group and the CIs were overlapping across groups
(Table 1). Thus, these results are not discussed here.
Nonanthropomorphism Ratings
On nonanthropomorphism ratings, the amygdala-
damaged participants gave consistently higher ratings to
technology (Figure 3) and robots (Figure 4) and consis-
tently lower ratings to both predictable and unpredictable
dogs (Figure 4) compared with the bootstrapped compar-
ison distribution. For all other variables, the amygdala-
damaged participants’ nonanthropomorphism ratings
varied across the mean point of the comparison group
and the CIs were overlapping across groups (Table 1).
As with anthropomorphism ratings that overlapped across
groups, these results are not discussed here.
Collapsing over comparison participants, associations
between anthropomorphism and nonanthropomorphism
ratings ranged from nonsignificantly correlated, r(91) =
.189, p = .07 (for the robot), to moderately strongly
correlated, r(91) = .53, p < .001 (for the unpredictable
gadgets), with an average correlation size of .38 (in-
cluding amygdala participants reveals the same pattern
of results with an average correlation size of .37). Thus,
anthropomorphism and nonanthropomorphism appear
moderately positively associated (but not redundant),
and in no cases were anthropomorphism and non-
anthropomorphism negatively correlated. This finding
is consistent with previous work demonstrating that
nonanthropomorphic attribution is independent from
anthropomorphic attribution (Waytz, Cacioppo, et al.,
2010).
In the amygdala-damaged group, anthropomorphism
and nonanthropomorphism scores on the IDAQ were
not significantly correlated (with df = 1, animals r =
.043, nature r = .374, technology r = .521). Although
also not significant, anthropomorphism and nonanthro-
pomorphism ratings were negatively correlated on the
predictable and unpredictable dogs (r = −.383, r =
−.256) and robot (r = −.654, again with df = 1).
Finally, the correlation of anthropomorphism and non-
anthropomorphism ratings for unpredictable gadgets
was positive but nonsignificant (r = .561), but there
was a strong negative correlation for predictable gadgets,
r(1) = −1.00, p < .001.
Figure 5. Distribution of
predictable and unpredictable
gadget scores from
bootstrap samples (green =
anthropomorphism; blue =
nonanthropomorphism), with
scores at the lower and upper
bound of the 95% CI shown by
black dotted lines. Scores of
individual amygdala-damaged
participants are overlaid on top.
*No overlap of CIs.
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For most stimuli, the relationship between anthro-
pomorphism and nonanthropomorphism ratings was
similar in amygdala-damaged participants and com-
parison participants, with two exceptions; 2 (Group:
healthy comparison vs. amygdala participants) × 2 (Attri-
bution: anthropomorphic vs. nonanthropomorphic)
ANOVAs conducted with each stimulus revealed sig-
nificant interaction effects for IDAQ technology, F(1,
94) = 3.793, p = .044, ηp
2 = .042, and the unpredictable
dog, F(1, 94) = 8.756, p= .004, ηp
2 = .085. Both are cases
where amygdala-damaged participants score lower than
healthy comparison participants on anthropomorphic
ratings and higher on nonanthropomorphic ratings.
This finding raises the possibility that social and non-
social attribution operate in somewhat of a zero-sum
fashion for these individuals on these particular stimuli,
such that when an entity lacks social relevance (such as
technology) people become more attuned to alternate
features such as its efficiency or appearance. However,
we hesitate to speculate too much on this finding be-
cause it does not emerge for all stimuli (and may be a
function of our stimuli), but it is worth exploring in
future research.
Response patterns within the IDAQ and dogs and
robot tasks indicate both comparison participants and
amygdala-damaged participants anthropomorphize
Table 1. Comparison of Anthropomorphism Ratings from Amygdala Participants and Comparison Sample
Bootstrapped Comparison
Samples with Mean above
Amygdala Participants (%)
95% CI (Z scores)
Fraction of SD Different
from Comparison Mean
Comparisons Amygdala A. P. A. M. B. G.
Anthropomorphism Ratings
IDAQ
Animals 66.06 −0.227 0.197 −0.553 −0.046 −0.01 −0.10 −0.52
Nature 16.49 −0.176 0.254 −0.350 2.576 −0.35 −0.34 2.43
Technologya 82.50 −0.153 0.329 −0.578 −0.442 −0.42 −0.54 −0.54
Dogs and robot
Predictable dog 35.87 −0.239 0.188 −0.787 1.555 0.00 −0.74 1.49
Unpredictable dog 16.46 −0.224 0.195 0.048 1.469 −0.11 0.38 1.43
Robota 82.33 −0.150 0.316 −0.583 −0.379 −0.55 −0.37 −0.37
Gadgets
Predictable gadgetsa 91.80 −0.162 0.290 −0.584 −0.545 −0.56 −0.53 −0.53
Unpredictable gadgets 12.51 −0.161 0.295 −0.187 2.455 2.22 −0.61 0.63
Nonanthropomorphism Ratings
IDAQ
Animals 80.05 −0.217 0.202 −0.817 −0.006 −0.88 0.00 −0.61
Nature 24.11 −0.216 0.205 −0.741 1.046 −0.71 1.10 0.83
Technologyb 5.82 −0.198 0.221 0.501 1.223 1.18 1.16 0.48
Dogs and robot
Predictable doga 91.72 −0.202 0.219 −1.040 −0.570 −1.00 −0.55 −0.80
Unpredictable doga 98.56 −0.207 0.212 −1.541 −0.799 −1.46 −0.77 −1.50
Robotb 18.58 −0.200 0.221 0.275 0.678 0.68 0.60 0.26
Gadgets
Predictable gadgets 68.28 −0.198 0.229 −1.129 1.368 1.29 −1.08 −1.08
Unpredictable gadgets 69.68 −0.195 0.226 −0.986 0.059 −0.24 −0.95 0.20
aAmygdala group below comparison group with no overlap of CIs.
bAmygdala group above comparison group with no overlap of CIs.
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inanimate entities (technology) to a lesser degree than
animate entities (animals). This was true of both com-
parison groups (German and American) separately.
Although amygdala-damaged participants appear to
anthropomorphize inanimate entities to an even lesser
degree than comparison participants, Gadgets task
results suggest that cues to animacy—in this case,
unpredictability—may markedly increase their anthropo-
morphism of technology. These findings support our
interpretation that animacy is a primary trigger for anthro-
pomorphism and are consistent with other work link-
ing animacy to mind attribution (Wheatley, Weinberg,
Looser, Moran, & Hajcak, 2011; Looser & Wheatley,
2010).
Finally, although both the comparison participants and
amygdala-damaged participants distinguish between ani-
mals and technology by anthropomorphizing the former
more than the latter, this pattern does not emerge for
nonanthropomorphic attribution. These findings sug-
gest that amygdala-damaged participants’ distinction
between animate and inanimate entities for anthropo-
morphism is specific to this type of social attribution and
does not apply to nonsocial attribution more generally.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This study argues that damage to the basolateral amyg-
dala diminishes mental state attribution toward non-
human entities, but only when these entities lack explicit
social cues. Our findings thus provide substantial im-
provements and further insight over prior neuroscience
studies on anthropomorphizing: We include three neuro-
logical participants (unlike the single one in Heberlein &
Adolphs, 2004), who have specific damage to only a set of
subnuclei within the amygdala (thought to subserve
spontaneous attentional functions) and use a much more
comprehensive set of stimuli and tasks to better specify
how the amygdala contributes to anthropomorphism.
The pilot study showed equivalent levels of anthropomor-
phism between amygdala-damaged participants and
comparison participants across stimuli but critically showed
that amygdala participants anthropomorphized stimuli
with explicit social cues to a greater degree than stimuli
lacking these cues.
Central to our research question, we measured anthro-
pomorphism and nonanthropomorphic attribution to-
ward a variety of stimuli, for both amygdala-damaged
participants and healthy comparison participants. The
focal study showed that amygdala-damaged participants
appear to anthropomorphize animate, living entities such
as animals and natural life forms to an equivalent and, in
some cases, greater degree than do the comparison
participants. Yet, amygdala-damaged participants did
not tend to anthropomorphize inanimate entities such
as technology.
This novel dissociation supports the interpretation that
there are multiple routes to anthropomorphizing. One
route depends on attention triggered by explicit social
cues, such as an entity’s animate movement, and this
processing component does not depend on the basolat-
eral amygdala. A second route depends on attention trig-
gered by other cues that are not explicitly social but that
can become associated with social meaning; this second
processing component requires the basolateral amyg-
dala. Our findings thus utilized the dissociation afforded
by basolateral amygdala damage to reveal two distinct
processing components to anthropomorphizing.
The present findings may seem surprising in light of
prior work that has demonstrated impaired processing
of social stimuli such as faces in participants with amyg-
dala damage—yet, these were in fact the class of stimuli
producing the most normal responses from our partici-
pants with amygdala lesions. We argue that these data
suggest a revision to the widely held view that the amyg-
dala is disproportionately important for social percep-
tion. That view is not so much wrong as insufficiently
detailed, since it conflates the multiple processes that
typically contribute to social perception: The amygdala is
critical only for some of these and not others. Specifically,
processes that can be triggered by overt, explicit social
cues do not require the amygdala, whereas those that
depend on learned associations of cues with semantic or
contextual social knowledge do. Examples of the former
would be explicitly social stimuli, which are anthropomor-
phized relatively normally in our amygdala participants.
Prior studies in such participants have similarly shown that
processes like conscious detection of fear faces (Tsuchiya,
Moradi, Felsen, Yamazaki, & Adolphs, 2009) or change de-
tection of people and animals (Wang, Tsuchiya, New,
Hurlemann, & Adolphs, 2015) are normal. By contrast, ex-
amples of the latter class of processes would be anthro-
pomorphizing an air purifier, which offers no explicit
social cues and the social attributes of which must in-
stead be inferred entirely from semantic knowledge.
This class of stimuli is anthropomorphized less by our
amygdala participants compared with healthy partici-
pants. Prior studies are also consistent with this finding,
when reinterpreted according to our hypothesis. The
well-known deficits in recognizing emotions (Adolphs,
Gosselin, et al., 2005; Adolphs, Tranel, & Baron-Cohen,
2002; Adolphs et al., 1999) and other social information
(Adolphs, Tranel, & Damasio, 1998) from faces in partic-
ipants with amygdala lesions depend on judgments that
require considerable and nuanced semantic knowledge
retrieved from relatively impoverished cues (e.g., the de-
gree of each emotion the person shown in the stimulus
might feel or how trustworthy somebody might be
judged just from static photos of their face with no other
information provided) and disappear when additional ex-
plicit disambiguating social cues are present (e.g., body
postures). Another study found that participants with
amygdala lesions were impaired in their aesthetic judg-
ments for completely nonsocial and abstract visual stim-
uli (Adolphs & Tranel, 1999), bearing similarity to the
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present deficit for nonsocial stimuli like an air purifier: In
both cases, it is the retrieval of learned associations with
these stimuli that appears to depend on the amygdala.
Perhaps the most congruent prior study (conducted in
the exact same three individuals with amygdala lesions) is
one by Harrison, Hurlemann, and Adolphs (2015), which
found that these participants’ judgments of others’ ap-
proachability were the most abnormal when they looked
at pictures of people whose faces had been erased; that
study concluded that the amygdala’s role must extend
beyond stimulus-triggered processing. Consistent with
our interpretation in the present article, this work sup-
ports the view that the basolateral amygdala is not neces-
sary for triggering social inferences in response to explicit
social cues but rather for triggering social inferences
when social cues are absent or ambiguous, and the infer-
ences instead have to be guided by context, semantic
knowledge, and reasoning. Indeed, the distinction that
our finding supports may have even broader application.
For instance, amygdala lesions impair aspects of emo-
tional memory, but here again it seems to be the more
semantically and abstract components of a memory
(“gist”) rather than its concrete features (“details”) that
is impaired (Adolphs, Buchanan, & Tranel, 2005).
Limitations of the Present Work
Our findings are strongly constrained by the participants
available. In the case of the participants with amygdala
lesions, we have only three, and there are substantial
differences between them, making it difficult to general-
ize conclusions about the consequences of amygdala
damage. For instance, one was American, and the other
two were German; education and age differed (college or
not; 27 vs. 36 years). Even for the two German twins,
prior studies have shown discordant brain activations to
social stimuli (Becker et al., 2012). In addition, another
limitation of the current sample is that two of the three
amygdala-damaged participants are identical twins (and
are thus genetically identical, with highly similar child-
hood experiences) and thus are not fully independent
observations. Future studies corroborating the present
conclusions will likely need to come from different types
of studies, such as fMRI studies examining amygdala
activation in healthy individuals where larger sample sizes
are possible.
A second limitation concerns the dependency of
responses on the tasks on context and culture. Future
studies should include large-sample (e.g., online) studies
that explicitly examine the effects of age, sex, and aspects
of cultural background to help further understand the
sensitivity of anthropomorphizing to such possibly con-
founding factors.
Finally, it is important to reiterate the logic of human
lesion studies. Our findings cannot demonstrate that the
amygdala directly causes anthropomorphizing; they only
show that the process can be disrupted in the absence of
the amygdala. This leaves open the exact causal contribu-
tion that the amygdala makes in healthy individuals. It is
also critical to remember that all patients had amygdala
lesions that are disproportionate to the basolateral amyg-
dala and that this damage was sustained developmentally.
These facts leave open the possibility that other compo-
nents of the amygdala might play additional, or different,
functional roles in anthropomorphizing, and they leave
open the possibility that acute amygdala lesions could
produce substantially more severe impairments in an-
thropomorphizing since they would preclude possible
compensation due to plasticity and reorganization
throughout the lives of our participants.
Relationship to Other Studies
Expanding on an initial finding by Heberlein and Adolphs
(2004) using one focal stimulus and one amygdala-
damaged participant, our study suggests that the
relationship between amygdala function and anthropo-
morphism is more nuanced. Our fundamental inter-
pretation that basolateral amygdala damage reveals
two distinct processing components to anthropomor-
phizing is supported by additional studies on the baso-
lateral amygdala using electrophysiology or fMRI. One
recent study showed that single neurons recorded
from the human basolateral amygdala encode informa-
tion based on holistic processing and experience, such
as the identity of a person, but not information based
on single social features, such as the direction of eye
gaze (Mormann et al., 2015). Relatedly, as we noted
above, other work found individuals with lesions to
the basolateral amygdala to have normal visual atten-
tion to explicitly social stimuli (pictures of people) in
visual search (Wang, Xu, et al., 2014). Both of these
studies argue that the long-recognized role of the
basolateral amygdala in attention is more nuanced than
previously thought: It appears to be based not on low-
level visual cues but rather on high-level information.
This reinterpretation was strengthened in another re-
cent finding that found neurons recorded in the human
basolateral amygdala in fact respond not merely to the
features in faces that make them show a particular
emotion (happiness and fear in that study) but rather
to the subjective judgment that the participant makes
about those faces (even when they mistake a fear face
for a happy face, for instance; Wang, Tudusciuc, et al.,
2014). Like this study, these existing studies of the
amygdala argue for a role in processing associations
between stimuli and their social meaning.
One additional study is particularly important, given
that it used the same individuals with basolateral amyg-
dala lesions that we used in our present study. Par-
ticipants were asked to engage in theory of mind tasks
while undergoing functional neuroimaging (Spunt et al.,
2015). Not only were the amygdala participants able to
perform the tasks, but they activated an entirely normal
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cortical network that is normally activated when people
engaged in theory of mind. This study corroborates the
finding that social attribution in an explicit task does not
require the amygdala and is consistent with the finding
here that participants with amygdala lesions are able to
make explicit social attributions and have normal social
knowledge.
Another notable finding from our present study that
relates to prior work on the amygdala concerns the
amygdala-damaged participants’ evaluations of technol-
ogy we found. The only case in which some amygdala-
damaged participants anthropomorphized technology
to a greater degree than healthy comparison partici-
pants was when evaluating technology that operated
unpredictably—a condition that makes gadgets appear
more human-like (Waytz, Morewedge, et al., 2010; Epley
et al., 2007). This additional finding may also be related
to other work showing that the amygdala is particularly
sensitive to encoding the unpredictability of stimuli and
presumably engaging attentional processes as a conse-
quence (Herry et al., 2007; Whalen, 1999).
The present research differs from prior work on amyg-
dala damage and anthropomorphism not only in using a
richer set stimuli but also in using only explicit ques-
tions about anthropomorphism in the focal study rather
than measuring spontaneous anthropomorphism alone
(Heberlein & Adolphs, 2004). Use of explicit questions
may have prompted participants to consider anthropo-
morphic features. However, this would only increase
the chance of false-negative findings (i.e., prompting
more anthropomorphism than participants would natu-
rally produce) and if anything would reduce the chance
for false positives. Indeed, for stimuli lacking social
salience, even explicit prompting did not encourage
anthropomorphism in our amygdala participants in the
focal study. The pilot study, which measured spontane-
ous anthropomorphism alone, mimicked this pattern of
results.
Another critical difference between this study and
prior work was our inclusion of specific nonanthropo-
morphic measures to provide an important dissociation
from the anthropomorphic measures. As seen with
comparison participants, amygdala-damaged participants’
ratings of anthropomorphic characteristics (items pertain-
ing to mental states) overall showed a different pattern of
attribution from nonanthropomorphic characteristics
(items pertaining to behavior or appearance). Thus, for
these participants, anthropomorphism appears to be
dissociable from trait attribution more generally.
Conclusions
In summary, basolateral amygdala damage reduces
anthropomorphic attribution toward purely nonsocial
stimuli but does not alter anthropomorphism toward
nonhuman stimuli with social cues. Thus, socially rele-
vant stimuli that act or look humanlike, or that prompt
a motivation for social sense-making, evoke anthropo-
morphism and mental state reasoning for people with
amygdala damage. However, when evaluating stimuli that
do not possess socially relevant features, people with
amygdala damage may not anthropomorphize, sug-
gesting they require more explicit contextual cues to
engage the process. This result is consistent with the
work showing that amygdala damage does not compro-
mise performance on an explicit false-belief reasoning
task, which prompts individuals to consider the mind
of another person (Spunt et al., 2015), as well as work
in monkeys with bilateral amygdala lesions suggesting
that the basic repertoire of social behavior is intact even
though context does not elicit it spontaneously (Amaral
et al., 2003). These findings support the view that the
amygdala is not essential for anthropomorphism per se
but rather that it is essential for engaging in anthropo-
morphism as a function of the goal relevance and social
salience provided by a particular context or instruction.
Beyond merely providing insight into amygdala func-
tion, these findings suggest a critical distinction between
two processing components of social cognition. The first,
which appears compromised as a result of basolateral
amygdala damage, is the rapid and immediate detection
of a stimulus’ social relevance, when contextual cues are
limited. The second, which is not compromised by amyg-
dala damage, is the attribution of social—in the present
research, mental—characteristics when the stimulus is
unambiguously (explicitly) social or when there are suffi-
cient context cues to elicit a social interpretation. Here,
anthropomorphism emerges even for participants with
amygdala lesions, but at a higher threshold than what is
normally seen, suggesting that many forms of anthropo-
morphism are not automatic but rather rely on explicit
knowledge that a stimulus should be considered social.
The attribution of mental states to a stimulus merely re-
quires the possession of social knowledge (i.e., general
knowledge about mental state capacities), and this does
not depend on the amygdala. But attentional and motiva-
tional processes need to be engaged first to trigger the
retrieval of such social knowledge, and this is what is
impaired in our amygdala participants.
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Notes
1. Although we describe the processes of social cue-
triggered anthropomorphism triggered and semantic-driven
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anthropomorphism as separate, we speculate that these
processes operate on a spectrum. For example, anthropo-
morphizing an animal that looks and acts like a human (e.g.,
a chimpanzee) likely relies more on social cues and less on
semantic knowledge, whereas anthropomorphizing a com-
puter that is inanimate and lacks observable humanlike fea-
tures likely relies more on semantic knowledge because it
elicits fewer social cues. In this way, the distinction between
these two processes represents a standard distinction in
cognition between bottom–up (social cue-triggered) versus
top–down (semantic-driven) processing, simply applied to
anthropomorphism.
2. We believe this sex imbalance between comparison groups
is unlikely to affect results given evidence suggesting that
anthropomorphism does not differ by sex per se (Saxton,
Mackey, McCarty, & Neave, 2016; Severson & Lemm, 2016).
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